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Source: *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Sep., 1937), pp. 336-343

Published by: [American Oriental Society](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/594593>

Accessed: 26-11-2015 22:44 UTC

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*Barabuḍur*. By PAUL MUS, with a preface by M. GEORGE COEDÈS.  
Hanoi: IMPRIMERIE D'EXTRÊME-ORIENT, 1935. Pp. \*302  
+ 802.

This is a book as monumental as the subject with which it deals: it embraces, indeed, far more than the title implies, extending to a detailed analysis of the entire history of Buddhist art; it is as much a treatise on Buddhism itself as on Buddhist art in particular, and must be considered as no less epoch making than the earlier work of Foucher, which forms in a general way the point of departure from which the author proceeds. The sections of the work, apart from the *Avant-propos* of 302 pp. which is reprinted from recent nos. of the BÉFEO, are entitled: Introduction; 1. Les interprétations architecturales; 2. Interprétations religieuses; 3. Le symbolisme du Barabuḍur; 4. Barabuḍur et le problème des cinq directions; 5. La valeur cosmique du stupa; Appendice, Les Sept Pas du Buddha et la doctrine des Terres Pures; all of the foregoing making up Tome I. Also, 6. Genèse de la Bouddhologie Mahāyāniste; forming the whole of Tome II, part 1, and presumably still to be followed by another part.

The particular characteristics of the work are its constant correlation of texts and monuments; and its emphasis on the continuity of the pre-Buddhist and Buddhist traditions, suggested by the motto printed on the wrapper, "Le Brahmanisme des Brāhmaṇa . . . père du Bouddhisme," taken from Sylvain Lévi, with the significant omission of Sylvain Lévi's continuation, "qu'il lui a légué une regrettable hérédité."

For M. Foucher, the earliest Buddha images are Gandharan.<sup>1</sup> However this may have been, their iconography, as he also points out, is Indian, and only their style is Hellenistic. The image pre-existed verbally (and therefore as a mental image) already in the old lists of the 32 major and 80 minor *lakṣaṇas*, on which (so far as they can be represented in art) the authenticity and efficacy of the image is held to depend throughout the subsequent history of Buddhist art, which is nothing if not "correct."<sup>2</sup> The Indian

<sup>1</sup> See, however, the recent important discussion of the dates of Gandharan sculptures by Benjamin Rowland in the *Art Bulletin*, vol. XVIII, 1936, pp. 387-400, where it is concluded that all can be situated between about 200 and 500 A. D.

<sup>2</sup> To say, as does Mr. Codrington (*Legacy of India*, p. 98) that "Indian

Buddha type on the other hand (which prevailed after a short struggle in the second and third centuries) has behind it not only the same iconographic prescriptions (in effect a *dhyāna mantra*), but also for the seated figure a tradition going back to the Indus Valley culture and for the standing figure a tradition going back to the Maurya stone figures of Yakṣas, and beyond these no doubt to wooden forms.

The Brahmanical cult had been aniconic, and this condition persisted in early Buddhism so far as the Buddha himself is concerned, who is represented by symbols only from the moment of the Nativity and not merely after the Awakening; it is no more, then, a matter of distinction between Bodhisattva and Buddha than it was of an inability of the artists to represent the human figure; the situation is similar to that of early Christianity, where symbols are employed by evident choice. We must not deduce from our own anthropocentric point of view and artistic preoccupations that the development of an image represented an advance, "on entendait recourir à une forme non pas inférieure, mais supérieure de l'oeuvre d'art en substituant des symboles à l'image" (p. \*66). The intellectual and abstract symbol corresponds to a contemplation; the image to the will, and prayer. Actually, however, the image is not a portrait, but retains a purely symbolic quality, and remaining a symbol is still a support of contemplation (*dhiyālamba*): it is rather to the Bodhisattvas and later Tārās that prayer is addressed. The whole tradition is based on the presumption of two distinct orders of existence, that of this and that of another world, between which a communication is only possible by a mediation; the incantation (*brahman*), for example, is outwardly what the deity (Brahman), knowable only thus by analogy, is inwardly. It is precisely in this sense that the Buddha says that "He who sees the Word (*dhammam*) sees Me." The audible doctrine, the physical body, and the work of art are all alike from this point of view "factitious" bodies (*nirmāṇa-kāya*), to be valued in their significance rather than in their actuality; it is in this sense that the image functions as a substitute, and implies a real presence.

The Vedic rite involves a simultaneous edification and reintegration of the divided deity and the sacrificer himself. The sacrifice

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iconography is a mediaeval accretion, derived from a folk idiom, eventually crystallising out in literary form" is a verbatim contradiction of the plain facts.

is literally a de-votion, the sacrificer being both built into the altar by virtue of the modulus taken from his own person ("On maçonne donc ainsi sa personne dans la bâtisse, où le dieu et l'homme s'unissent enfin," p. \*54), and by a symbolic self-immolation on the altar itself. It is M. Mus' particular merit to have brought out clearly that the basic principles of the Brahmanical *rite* survive in the Buddhist *cult*, as also, of course, in the corresponding Hindu iconolatry. The patron, who takes the place of the sacrificer, is incorporated into the image in the same way by means of a modulus taken from his own person, and also when an image is made of gold, by using an amount of gold equal to his own weight, and by which he is therefore represented metaphysically, "gold" having throughout the transcendental values of spirit, light, immortality. And finally, the act of worship is only perfected to the extent that an assimilation of the worshipper to the transcendental form of the Buddha is effected. Just as the first operation of the artist in *dhyāna* had involved a self-identification with the imitable form of the idea to be represented, so is it for the spectator guided by the visible representation to effect a similar *adaequatio rei et intellectus*: all this, supported by means of citations from the Chinese inscriptions recorded by Chavannes, and other sources, is in perfect accord with the formulated mediaeval Indian aesthetic, which makes of the determinants (*vibhāva*) the occasion of the "finding of a common ground" (*sādhāraṇya*), and identifies the tasting of the "flavor" (*rasa*) of the work with a supra-sensual intuition.

In this connection M. Mus speaks almost always, with what seems to us less than his usual penetration, of a ritual "magic": magic, however, is an application of, and not to be confused with, metaphysics or even religion; the Vedic rite is metaphysical. To speak of "the magical essence of the man" (p. 205) is ontologically meaningless; the only possible "essence" that can be distinguished from an "existence" is a spiritual or metaphysical *principle*, the idea or reason of the thing,—an immaterial entity, then, far removed from any plane affectible by any kind of magical operation. In using such a term as "magic" one must preserve the senses in which the word is employed in the environment considered; it must be remembered that from an Indian point of view, "magic" is not merely a supernatural power, but an operative, however lowly, science.

It is surprising, too, that M. Mus should repeat that the specifically Buddhist position is a denial of the *ātman* (p. \*128). It has been sufficiently shown by Mrs. Rhys Davids and others that such well known expressions as *na me so attā* state in fact that “*This* (body and soul) are not my *Ātman*”<sup>3</sup> and not at all that “There is no *Ātman*.” If a *puḍgala*, or individuality is later introduced, as a designation of the bearer of the burden of retribution, this is not the very man, but the body and soul that are not the *Ātman*; *puḍgala* and *attā* together correspond to the “two selves” of the man discussed in the Jaiminīya Brāhmana, I. 17. 1 (see JAOS 19. 2. 116). The fact is that the transcendent person of the Buddha is the *Ātman*, and if there is a Buddhist, as there is also a Brahmanical, *nirātmya*, this *nirvāṇic* state of desperation has nothing to do with the expression *anattā*, which merely denies to the physical and psychic elements of the empirical individuality any spiritual character.

Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are not so much successive as complementary aspects of Buddhism; the former related to the latter somewhat as are the Apocryphal to the canonical Christian “Acts”; in both cases the apocryphal material dominates the cult and iconography, and one may say that for a knowledge of Buddhism as a whole the art is no less important than the literature. It should not be overlooked that “apocryphal” by no means necessarily means “spurious,” but rather “esoteric.” The monastic type of the Buddha is common ground alike to Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism; but as M. Mus has formerly shown in an important discussion of “Le Buddha paré” (BÉFEO, 1928) there is also a royal type in which the values of the Buddhas not only as ascetic but also as Cakravartin and in the Sambhogakāya are represented; the Messiah is both king and priest. M. Mus has done more than anyone else to bring out clearly the distinction between the esoteric doctrine taught by the Buddha to an audience of Bodhisattvas in the fifteenth chapter of the “Lotus,” from that which had previously been received by the ordinary monks; it is not a matter of the “closed” or “open” hand, on the contrary all is

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<sup>3</sup> As St. Paul expresses it, “The word of God . . . extends even unto the sundering of soul from spirit” (Heb. 4, 12). The distinction is that of the “knower of the field” from the “field” itself, Bhagavad Gitā, Ch. XIII.

always offered, but it depends upon individual capacity what can be received. The royal Buddha images of the Pāla period and of South-eastern Asia are an embodiment in stone of the earlier cult practice of offering royal adornments to the Buddha, and placing them on the image, of which practice we learn both from Sinhalese records and from Hsüan Tsang.

We are particularly interested by the fact that M. Mus interprets *sambhoga* (p. 659), not as a "joint fruition," but as a "perfect, or complete, fruition"; just as *sambodhi* is not a joint awakening, but a perfect awakening. We have reached an identical conclusion by a quite different route, which may be briefly outlined here. In the Ṛgveda the Ṛbhus are said to have made Tvaṣṭṛ's single bowl into four, by which we understand an extension of the four directions. We are familiar with the idea of a derivation of nourishment from the four quarters. Now in the well-known miracle of the four bowls, he makes into one the four feeding bowls that are brought to him by the Regents of the Quarters, and eats from this bowl alone. That is the *sambhoga*, a total fruition without necessity of local motion; just as *sambuddhi* is "total awakening." The whole cycle represented by the work of the Ṛbhus and converse "miracle" corresponds to the dictum "I being one, become many; and being many, become one" (Sāmyutta Nikāya, II. 212).

It would be impossible even to summarize within the limits of a review all that M. Mus has to say, much of it novel and profound, on the nature of the stupa. It is by no means merely a funerary and memorial monument, but veritably an icon, animated either by relics, by a written word, or by the mere fact that the Word has been spoken on the site where the stupa is erected, or however otherwise the necessary connection has been made between the here and now and eternal yonder. The principle underlying the use of relics is that which is reflected in the magical practice of establishing a connection with, and obtaining a power over, an absent or unknown person by means of its traces, such as parts of the body, clothing, personal possessions, or footprints. The cult of the Footprints, moreover, is evidently on the one hand a continuation of the old Vedic motif of the tracking of the Hidden Light by means of its spoor (*pada*), and no less evidently on the other hand analogous to the Christian doctrine of the *vestigium pedis*.

The stupa is an imitation of the cosmic body of the transcendent Buddha, just as the fire altar had been an imitation of the cosmic

body of Prajāpati; a habitation in the same sense that the Christian church has been regarded as simultaneously the tomb and the house of God. Every stupa is literally an hypostasis of the universe; the vertical axis which is the principle of its whole design is the axis of the universe; the stupa is the universe in a likeness, rather than a likeness of the universe, just as the image is the Buddha in a likeness and not a likeness of the Buddha. The Indian stupa or temple is moreover not merely a constructed space but also a constructed time, an image of the revolving year. The perambulatory processions of deities, or kings (in cars which are themselves imitations of the cosmic archetype which is the Vedic chariot of light ( *jyotiratha* ) and analogous to the Biblical chariot of fire) are imitations of the solar perambulation of the universe: in the case of the immovable stupa or temple this temporal motion is indicated, if not always by the actual wheels of the “ *ratha* ” and draught horses as at Konārak, then by repetitions of the central architectural form on a reduced scale, visible in succession to the perambulant spectator (p. 383); or in the same way when a stupa is provided with eyes or images on all four sides, these are the oriented aspects of the single person whose true position is axial. The stupa is not so much erected on a given site as upon a diagram of the orient, a  *rose des vents* , a lotus that is in principle the whole extent of space (p. 381; Maitri Up. VI. 2); the ground plan of the stupa, notably at Barabudūr itself, is a  *maṇḍala* .

The central axis is the Vedic  *skambha* , and embodies the whole extension of the building in principle. This axis is a  *stauros*  that holds apart heaven and earth; it is then synonymous with the thunderbolt, lance, or other weapon with which the chthonic serpent is transfixed in the beginning. To this day a fixation of the site, by which earthquakes are avoided, is effected by a symbolic transfixion of the head of the chthonic serpent, Ananta (an excellent reference can be added here, to the Legend of the Iron Pillar at Delhi, printed at the close of Grierson and Waterman's  *Lay of Alha* ). On the other hand, the axis, passing upwards through the dome of the stupa becomes a mast ( *yaṣṭi, yūpa* ); it is the path of the vertical  *nāḍi*  or vector by which the Spirit ascends at death from the apex of the “heart” to pass out through the dome of the cranium; the mast above the stupa is the same thing as the flame emerging from the  *uṣṇīṣa*  in many Buddha types. In this connection M. Mus discusses the “bow and arrow” symbol on early

Indian coins, in which M. Foucher thought that he recognized a stupa in cross section. We do not question the analogy of the vertical pillar with its armed point to the royal lance around which a stupa is built by the Sinhalese king Duṭṭhagāmani (cf. the lance symbol on punch-marked coins),<sup>4</sup> but we think M. Mus is mistaken in excluding at the same time the idea of the bow and arrow, and in seeing in this idea only a late interpretation or mere allegory, “especially as the bow and arrow play so small a part in Buddhist imagery” (p. 118). This last is scarcely a matter of fact; it is for example as an expert archer that the Buddha wins the hand of Yaśodharā (as Rāma that of Sitā), and notably in the Asadisa Jātaka that the Bodhisattva is represented as an “unfailing archer” (*akkhaṇa-vedhin*) in a miraculous legend that is unmistakably a symbolic statement of the *sūtrātman* doctrine. We think that the bow and arrow symbol, while not necessarily the symbol exclusively of a stupa, is such in a certain sense; the ultimate significance of the symbol is most clearly stated in the Muṇḍaka Up. II., 2, 2-4, where it is a question of making of oneself the arrow, and of a penetration of the sun; the position of the sun in the vault of heaven, of the “eye” of the vault of a dome, socket of the mast in the dome of the stupa, and that of the foramen of the skull are all analogous, and all considered in Indian texts from the same point of view, that of the ascent of the spirit of the deceased. We should say that while the bow and arrow symbol does not represent a stupa directly, its idea is one that is also embodied in the symbolism of the domed stupa.

Another point discussed at some length is the virtual identification of the Buddha with Brahmā. M. Mus remarks that the Buddha “est le père du monde pour le sauver, non pour l’avoir crée” (p. 624). This is a false antithesis. Creation and redemption are inseparably linked. There can be no escape from the necessity of birth except for those who have been born. The Way that leads beyond the world passes *through* the world. The setting in motion of the Wheel of Principles (*dhamma-cakka*) is at the same time a creation and a predication: it is in a similar sense that the Sun in Maitri Up. VI. 30 is called at once the cause of

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<sup>4</sup> In a Champa (Annam) inscription of 658 A. D. we read “It was there that Kauṇḍinya, the greatest of Brāhmaṇas, planted the javelin,” i.e. established his sovereignty.



creation, heaven, and of final emancipation (*sarga, svarga, apavarga*). The lamentation of the Devas when the Buddha hesitates to set in motion the Wheel of the Law (as Agni hesitates in RV. X. 51 to accept the position of driver of the cosmic chariot) shows what values still really inhere in the Buddhist symbol, however its meaning may have been restricted in a special context to mean a "first preaching" at Benares.

All that we have been able to do is to suggest the wealth of the documented material to be found in *Barabudur*, and to emphasize the establishment of a method in which the researcher no longer envisages Buddhism as an isolated and revolutionary phenomenon, but in its setting, and no longer considers the texts alone or the art alone, but each as an alternative expression of the same underlying theses. This amounts to a veritable bringing to life of the "dry bones" of what might otherwise have been a merely statistical archeology.

We may remark that criticisms of M. Mus' work by Przysluski have already appeared in the first volume of the JHAS. and in JISOA. vol. IV.

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*A propos des voyages aventureux de Fernand Mendez Pinto.* Notes de A. J. H. CHARIGNON, recueillies et complétées par Mlle. M. MÉDARD. Pékin: IMPRIMERIE DES LAZARISTES, 1936. Pp. xviii, 417.

Fernão Mendez Pinto is one of those disturbing writers with whom one can never quite dispense and whom one can never quite believe. His *Peregrinação*, published in 1614, more than fifty years after Pinto's return from the East, reads like an interesting tale of adventures, which, however, inspires little confidence. In spite of this feeling of mistrust, shared by most scholars who have studied him, certain episodes, for which he is the sole authority, have found more or less credence, since they seemed to supply some sort of information where no other was available. Obviously such uncertainty as to the value of a historical source is extremely unsatisfactory and a thorough-going study of all its statements would be a real service to scholarship.